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LEGAL REALISM AND NATURAL LAW 
Dan Priel and Charles Barzun* 
Forthcoming in Law, Theory and History: New Essays on a Neglected Topic 
(Maksymilian Del Mar & Michael Lobban eds., forthcoming 2015). 
Abstract: The possibility of any meaningful relationship between the legal realists and natural 
law looks at first rather far-fetched. When it first appeared on the jurisprudential scene, legal 
realism was savagely attacked by proponents of natural law theory. To this day legal realism is 
depicted as a modernist, critical, at times almost nihilist approach to law, the polar opposite of 
the ancient natural law theory that traces its roots to Greek and Roman philosophy, and insists 
on unchanging objective values. And yet, two of the most famous legal realists, Karl Llewellyn 
and Jerome Frank, expressed in some of their writings more than a passing endorsement of 
natural law theory. The purpose of this essay is to try and explain this seemingly odd aspect of 
their work and in this way help in reassessing their work. We do so by explaining how they 
understood natural law and how they incorporated it in their work. Though they did not un-
derstand the term in precisely the same way, for both of them natural law was connected to 
the values of the community, which both of them thought were central to understanding law, 
for explaining how it could remain relatively certain, and ultimately, how it derived its au-
thority.  
INTRODUCTION 
Legal realism and natural law? The very juxtaposition sounds odd. In popular aca-
demic imagination natural law is all about eternal principles discoverable by pure rea-
son, while legal realism is all about ‘law in flux’.1 Natural law is the legal theory of 
Aristotle, Cicero, and Aquinas, whereas legal realism has variously associated with 
American pragmatism, logical positivism, behaviourism, psychoanalysis, modern an-
thropology, even quantum mechanics—all ideas firmly embedded in the twentieth-
century psyche. It is the association with these ideas that has led one commentator to 
say that ‘with its emphasis on empirical and functional methodologies and its thor-
oughgoing skepticism about moral or epistemological absolutes, [legal realism] would 
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University and Professor, University of Vir-
ginia School of Law. 
1 See Karl N. Llewellyn, ‘Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound’ (1931) 44 
Harvard Law Review 1222, 1236. 
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seem to be a quintessentially modernist jurisprudence’.2 What could such an approach 
have in common with the most un-modernist of legal theories, an approach that more 
than any other is associated with moral and epistemological absolutes?  
The apparent disparity is not merely a matter of competing philosophies; it is part 
of history. When the realists came to prominence in the 1930s, their fiercest critics 
were Catholic scholars, who often contrasted legal realism with natural law. One of 
them wrote that, ‘Realism by taking God, soul, mind, will, innate dignity, and innate 
de jure independence away from man, makes man the pawn of might, and breaks the 
neck of democracy. Godless Behaviorism and Pragmatism are the head hunters, with 
Democracy and popular sovereignty the victims’.3 He associated legal realism with 
fascism and declared that in the battle of the day ‘Democracy versus the Absolute 
State means Natural Law versus Realism’.4  
Moving to the present, the gulf between legal realism and natural law still appears 
vast. Especially in the American context, natural law is these days typically invoked in 
defence of conservative causes;5 by contrast, the realists’ most immediate association 
is with the New Deal, a political agenda that to this day remains an anathema to many 
on the American right. The association of legal realism with natural law theory will 
also sound odd to those versed in contemporary debates in legal theory. Those who 
see the realists as early precursors of the critical legal studies movement will agree 
with Joseph William Singer that the ‘legal realists removed the possibility of answer-
ing…questions [like how we come to our normative commitments and how we should 
question them] by appeal to natural law or to the logical implications of abstract con-
cepts’.6 Finally, even among the narrower confines of analytic jurisprudence the asso-
ciation of legal realism with natural law flies in the face of an influential recent inter-
pretation of legal realism according to which legal realism presupposes the truth of 
‘hard’ legal positivism.7 This reading places legal realism as the polar jurisprudential 
opposite of natural law theory.  
2 G. Edward White, ‘Recapturing New Deal Lawyers’ (1988) 102 Harvard Law Review 489, 514. 
3 See, e.g., Francis E. Lucey, ‘Natural Law and American Legal Realism: Their Respective Contribu-
tion to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society’ (1942) 30 Georgetown Law Journal 493, 526, 531–32. 
Many additional examples are cited in Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific 
Naturalism & the Problem of Value (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1973) 160–72; Neil 
Duxbury, ‘The Reinvention of American Legal Realism’ (1992) 12 Legal Studies 137, 164–73. 
4 Lucey (n 3) 533; to the same effect see Palmer (n 3) 62–63; cf Roscoe Pound, ‘The Revival of Natu-
ral Law’ (1942) 17 Notre Dame Lawyer 287, 315, 322–23, 325.  
5 See, e.g., Molly Worthen, ‘The First Principles of Rick Santorum’, New York Times (9 February 
2012), available at http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/the-first-principles-of-rick-
santorum/.  
6 Joseph William Singer, ‘Legal Realism Now’ (1988) 76 California Law Review 465, 541. 
7 See Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Le-
gal Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 73, 134–35. For critiques of Leiter’s position (in-
 
3 
And yet, when one looks at the works of the people who called themselves ‘legal 
realists’, matters look less clear cut. Hessel Yntema stated that ‘the classification of 
American legal realism in the category of positivism along with Austin, Kelsen, etc., is 
so superficial as to border on the perverse’.8 This does not yet show that the realists 
saw themselves as natural lawyers—after all, they might have seen themselves as a new 
kind of approach to law—but it already somewhat destabilizes the association between 
realism and positivism. Even more surprisingly, when one turns to the works of the 
two most famous legal realists one finds in them clear affirmations of a positive con-
nection between legal realism and natural law. As early as 1938 Karl Llewellyn wrote 
that ‘it is difficult for me to conceive of the ultimate legal ideals of any of the writers 
who have been called realists in terms which do not resemble amazingly the type and 
even the content of the principles of a philosopher’s Natural Law’.9 Even more sur-
prisingly, Jerome Frank, usually considered among the most extreme realists, the one 
realists whose views are sometimes thought to border on nihilism,10 stated: ‘I do not 
understand how any decent man today can refuse to adopt, as a basis of modern civili-
zation, the fundamental principles of Natural Law.’11 As these words do not fit the 
image Frank as the ‘bad boy’ of legal realism, they are not often discussed. When they 
are, they are explained away as reflecting the views of the ‘later’, mellower Frank (by 
then a federal appellate judge), troubled by the horrors of World War II.12  
We will address this claim in more detail below, but already here we will note 
some difficulties with it. In the same year Frank wrote the words just quoted, he pub-
lished Courts on Trial, which is hardly a complacent look at the legal system. On the 
other hand, already in 1932 Frank forcefully denied that the realists are ‘“positivists” 
who are exclusively devoted to whatever is now happening in the legal world’. The 
realists, he said, were all ‘eager…to improve the judicial system, to make it more effi-
cient, more responsive to social needs, more “just”, if you like that word’.13  
dependent of the arguments developed here) see Danny Priel, ‘Were the Legal Realists Legal Positivists’ 
(2008) 27 Law and Philosophy 309; Dan Priel, ‘Jurisprudence between Science and the Humanities’ (2012) 
4 Washington University Jurisprudence Review 269, 307–316. 
8 Hessel Yntema, ‘Jurisprudence on Parade’ (1941) 39 Michigan Law Review 1154, 1164. 
9 Karl N. Llewellyn, ‘One “Realist’s” View of Natural Law for Judges’ (1939) 15 Notre Dame Lawyer 
3, 8. 
10 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, ‘American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the 
Noble Dream’ (1977) 11 Georgia Law Review 969, 974; Leslie Pickering Francis, ‘Law and Philosophy: 
From Skepticism to Value Theory’ (1993) 27 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 65, 73. 
11 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind, 6th printing (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1949) xx.  
12 Perhaps the first to make this claim is Malcolm P. Sharp, ‘Realism and Natural Law’ (1957) 24 
University of Chicago Law Review 648, 655–57.  
13 Jerome Frank, ‘Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Legal Thinking’ (1932) 17 Cornell Law 





One aim of this essay is therefore to make sense of these seemingly odd state-
ments. We will argue below that rather than suggesting a radical change in the views 
of Llewellyn and Frank, they reflect ideas that can be found in even in their earliest, 
and seemingly most critical, works. Before we proceed, however, we must add an im-
portant caveat. While Llewellyn and Frank were in their day, and remain to this day, 
among the best-known legal realists, we do not claim that they are necessarily repre-
sentative of all legal realists, let alone of some abstract construct called ‘legal realism’. 
Both Llewellyn and Frank often warned against the ‘Schools’ approach to jurispru-
dence for its tendency to lump together different thinkers who are in fact quite differ-
ent.14 Indeed, what we say below is not meant to deny that some self-described legal 
realists expressed scepticism about natural law ideas.15 And as our argument unfolds, it 
will become apparent that even Llewellyn and Frank understood the term somewhat 
differently. One incidental aim of this essay is thus to serve as reminder that all at-
tempts to identify what legal realism is should be treated carefully. Such efforts are 
often illuminating, but they must be understood as constructs of the views of numer-
ous individuals who on many things held quite different views. In this essay we there-
fore limit our focus to an analysis of the views of two legal realists.  
One stumbling block to any meaningful discussion of the question any possible 
relationship between legal realism and natural law requires some clarification of the 
possible senses in which Llewellyn and Frank thought of themselves as natural law-
yers and (if this is any different) opponents of positivism. In so doing, we must begin 
by setting aside several possible interpretations of these terms as inadequate. To 
begin, neither Frank nor Llewellyn believed that consistency with true morality was a 
condition of legal validity (or, more colloquially, that an unjust law was not valid law). 
From the vantage point of contemporary jurisprudence, this may seem odd, as the 
divide between legal positivism and anti-positivism is often defined in terms of legal 
validity. But from a historical perspective, the absence of a discussion on the matter of 
legal validity is unremarkable. If one looks at the long history of natural law thinking, 
one finds the conditions of legal validity rarely discussed. In fact, in English one is 
hard-pressed to find any discussions that pit legal positivism against natural law before 
1930s.16 Even today, some natural lawyers deny that ‘natural law theory’ is committed 
                                                    
14 K.N. Llewellyn, Law in Our Society: A Horse-Sense Theory of the Institution of Law (unpublished 
course materials, 1950 edition) 82–83; see also Jerome Frank, If Men Were Angels: Some Aspects of Govern-
ment in a Democracy (New York: Harper, 1942) 277–79.  
15 See Walter W. Cook, ‘Scientific Method and the Law’ (1927) 13 American Bar Association Journal 
303, 306; Joseph Walter Bingham, ‘Law Schools and the Future’ (1954) 6 Journal of Legal Education 486, 
496–97 note 3; Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘Natural Law’ (1918) 32 Harvard Law Review 40. 
16 The very contrast between natural law and legal positivism, as two opposing jurisprudential 
schools is of a much more recent provenance than is often assumed. In Germany it begins to appear in 






the view that an unjust law is not law.17 Since many prominent natural lawyers profess 
a decided lack of interest in the question of legal validity and are willing to counte-
nance the possibility of unjust laws, the absence of a discussion of this question in 
Llewellyn and Frank’s works does not undermine our suggestion that they endorsed 
versions of natural law. 
After setting aside such questions, is there any remaining interesting connection 
between legal realism and natural law? Even if so, is the connection of more than an-
tiquarian interest today?18 Our answer is, Yes and yes. First, by appealing to natural 
law Frank and Llewellyn both signalled their commitment to the reality of value and 
the possibility of reasoning about it. Even if they could not come to accept everything 
carried under the banner of natural law, they maintained a faith in some notion (how-
ever vaguely specified) of moral reality. Second, Llewellyn and Frank believed that 
one could not clearly distinguish between legal and other sorts of norms, whether 
moral, social, or political. And third, Llewellyn and Frank saw their views about law 
and jurisprudence as closely related to inquiries about politics, and especially Ameri-
can politics. More specifically, their account of law was an account of American law, 
which they presented as intimately tied to American democracy, both of which they 
explicitly connected to natural law.  
Not every legal positivist will disagree with all three points; the third one in par-
ticular is these days accepted by many legal positivists. But taken together, these three 
points represent a position clearly at odds with the views of many twentieth century 
and contemporary legal positivists, including the most prominent Anglophone legal 
positivist, H.L.A. Hart.19 Indeed, on all three counts Llewellyn and Frank can count 
as allies Hart’s primary anti-positivist antagonists, Lon Fuller and Ronald Dworkin, 
both of whom, at least on occasion, associated themselves with natural law.20 
                                                                                                                                               
it only in the 1930s in writings of scholars well-versed in European jurisprudence. See e.g., K.N. Llewel-
lyn, ‘On Philosophy in American Law’ (1934) 82 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 205, 206–08; Lon 
L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself (Chicago: Foundation Press, 1940) 4–6. At the time the debate is not 
treated exclusively (or even primarily) as a debate about legal validity.  
17 See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
363–66. Even those who do think that natural law theory entails the idea that unjust law is not law think 
this is only a small component of natural law theory.  
18 We explore (but don’t resolve) some of the issues arising more general questions arising from al-
luded to in the text in Charles Barzun & Dan Priel, ‘Jurisprudence and (Its) History’ (2015) 101 Virginia 
Law Review (forthcoming). 
19 As a moral sceptic (of sorts) Hart may well have disagreed with all three. And he is not alone. Oth-
er prominent legal positivists whose legal positivism may be related to a version of moral anti-realism 
include Hans Kelsen, Jules Coleman, and Brian Leiter. 
20 See Lon L. Fuller, ‘Human Purpose and Natural Law’ (1945) 53 Journal of Philosophy 697. 
Dworkin was used the term less frequently, but at least once he defined and endorsed natural law as the 






I. KARL LLEWELLYN: THE ROMANTIC NATURAL LAWYER 
In Hart’s famous characterization, American jurisprudence swerves between two ex-
tremes he dubbed the nightmare and the noble dream, extreme scepticism of the law 
on the one hand, and unbridled faith in it on the other. And though Hart stated that 
the nightmare view is most associated with legal realism,21 in that essay he recognized 
(in a way he did not recognize before) that at least as far as Karl Llewellyn was con-
cerned, the picture was more complex.22 The truth is that the more one reads Llewel-
lyn, the more difficult it becomes to imagine a more enthusiastic noble dreamer of the 
law. Rather than a sceptic, Llewellyn was the law’s greatest romantic.23  
The following words give a sense of Llewellyn’s romanticism:24  
There is the man who loves creativeness, who can without loss of sleep combine risk-
taking with responsibility, who sees and feels institutions as things built and to be built 
to serve functions, and who sees the functions as vital and law as a tool to be eternally 
reoriented to justice and to general welfare. There is the other man who loves order, 
who finds risk uncomfortable and has seen so much irresponsible or unwise innovation 
that responsibility to him means caution, who sees and feels institutions as the tested, 
slow-built ways which for all their faults are man’s sole safeguard against relapse into 
barbarism, and who regards reorientation of the law in our polity as essentially com-
mitted to the legislature.25 
This embrace of the virtues of uncertainty did not imply chaos. As early as in a book 
published in 1933 (based on lectures delivered in 1928–29) Llewellyn wrote that 
‘“free law” is free only within this small space, and in no way threatens a true legal 
certainty’.26 At the same time, what stopped the law from calcifying was ‘[t]he quest of 
                                                                                                                                               
Dworkin, ‘“Natural” Law Revisited’ (1982) 34 University of Florida Law Review 165, 165. The similarity 
between this view and Fuller’s is unmistakable. 
21 Hart (n 10) 974.  
22 See his reference to Llewellyn in ibid. 978–79.  
23 For a sense of Llewellyn’s romanticism see N.E.H. Hull, ‘The Romantic Realist: Art, Literature 
and the Enduring Legacy of Karl Llewellyn’s “Jurisprudence”’ (1996) 40 American Journal of Legal History 
115, esp. 117–23, 140–45; William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012) 117–23, 143–44.  
24 This is romanticism of the moderns. See Jackson Lears, Something for Nothing: Luck in America 
(New York: Penguin, 2003) 281–82, 284–85. 
25 Karl N. Llewellyn, ‘Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about 
How Statutes Are to Be Construed’ (1950) 3 Vanderbilt Law Review 395, 397. As we will show below, 
Frank held a similar view. And other realists held the same view. See William O. Douglas, ‘The Dissent: 
A Safeguard of Democracy’ (1948) 32 Journal of the American Judicature Society 104, 105 (those who be-
lieve in the ‘democratic faith will rejoice in the uncertainty of law and find strength and glory in it’); Max 
Radin, in My Philosophy of Law: Credos of Sixteen American Scholars (Boston: Boston Law Book, 1941) 287, 
293 (talking of ‘the glorious uncertainty of the law’).  
26 Karl Llewellyn, The Case Law System in America, Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi trans. (Chica-






Right Goals [which]…is…an inherent part of any healthy institution of law: a vital 
part’.27  
The quest of Right Goals and its role in any healthy institution of law points to-
wards the sense Llewellyn saw himself as a natural lawyer. On its own, however, it 
establishes only a superficial link with natural law thinking. Moreover, like many en-
thusiasts for the common law before and after him, Llewellyn was wary of philosophi-
cal abstractions, and therefore had another reason to be wary of appeals to natural 
law. He worried that many natural lawyers committed ‘the error’ of going on a quest 
that ‘carries the quester into the realm of untestable truth’.28 It was tempting but dan-
gerous for the committed natural lawyer to end up with nothing but ‘a fighting faith, 
explored and buttressed by his reason, but necessarily inconclusive on the level of 
testable truth’.29 Llewellyn therefore distanced himself from the view that judges 
should turn to their understanding of what right reason required in their quest for 
identifying the law.30  
But if natural law was neither abstract reason nor the judge’s own reason, what 
was it and where did come from? In an early discussion Llewellyn stated tentatively 
that ‘it is to law that we owe the conception of justice’, it is the law’s ‘own perfec-
tion’,31 and that it is this idea that provides the main limit and constraint on the 
judge.32 This statement reflects a fairly familiar idea of the common law as a basis for 
its own improvement. This is the idea that sees the common law as a practice that 
‘works itself pure’, by reworking and refining disparate decisions into a coherent set 
of principles. A few years later, when Llewellyn began to make more open references 
                                                                                                                                               
‘free law’ movement. It has been forcefully argued that the free law movement has been an intellectual 
source for American legal realism. See James E. Herget & Stephen Wallace, ‘The German Free Law 
Movement as the Source of American Legal Realism’ (1987) 73 Virginia Law Review 399. While we do 
not deny that there are important similarities between the writers in of the two ‘schools’, it is notable 
that Llewellyn was fairly critical of free law. After stating that the judge’s ‘freedom of movement’ is only 
within ‘a small space’, he added that ‘[t]he only noteworthy contribution of the “free law” movement 
is…to advocate that [the] freedom of movement be consciously understood and not exercised blindly’. 
Llewellyn, ibid. As we will show below, Llewellyn had closer affinities to the German historical school, 
which was one of the free law scholars’ targets. 
27 Llewellyn (n 14) 60. Incidentally, it was because Kelsen ignored this aspect of law that Llewellyn 
thought his work was ‘sterile’. Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See also Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1960) 422. 
31 K.N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: Some Lectures on Law and Its Study (Columbia University, 1930) 
121. 
32 ‘[C]ourts must move within the framework of the given rules. The rules, however socially unjust 
they seem to [any individual]…are there. The court is in part their mouthpiece. What it can do, all it can 





to natural law, it becomes possible to identify a subtle but crucial shift in his view. 
Llewellyn began to distinguish between the ‘philosopher’s Natural Law’ and that of 
the lawyer.33 The former, while significant is too abstract and general to be of much 
use for the practical needs of a lawyer who seeks fairly determinate solutions to legal 
problems. When the lawyer is concerned with natural law, by contrast, he is con-
cerned with ‘his rules for his society’.34 This is where the lawyer’s natural law was far 
more significant. What was that? Llewellyn’s new alternative to ‘untestable truths’ of 
the philosopher was no longer to quarry the law’s own materials for answers. Instead, 
Llewellyn suggested that the source of law’s improvement was the people. The more 
familiar natural law theories focus on ‘Goals as the heart of Jurisprudence and on 
Right Reason as a method’; theories that focus on positive law and seek to find an-
swers to novel problems there ‘center on the prevailing Rules and Concepts of Law as 
the structured machinery without which nothing gets done and on formal logic as a 
method’. This approach, however, ignores ‘[t]he people whose law Law is and for 
whom Law is’. It is for this reason that for Llewellyn natural law ‘bears a relation to 
positive law…which is curiously similar to the relation of such positive law to actually 
prevailing human behavior’.35 Modifying the familiar image of natural law as higher 
law, Llewellyn stated that ‘[i]f in one sense Official Law (and Natural Law) must be 
above the people to control them, in another sense it must be in and of them, or it 
ceases to be in society’.36  
Thus, against the familiar image of natural law as a set of unshifting Archimedean 
points in a constantly changing world, Llewellyn offered a different conception of 
natural law as the basis for his risk-taking ideal for the law. Natural law thus stood for 
the essential vitality of law, for its openness to critique and change. The courts who 
adopted such an attitude, courts that worked in what Llewellyn called the ‘grand 
style’, often described their jurisprudence in terms of natural law: ‘To me…the fea-
ture which they treat as “Natural Law” thinking has as its essence a conscious and 
sustained quest for and accounting to the best reason a court could find’.37 
Llewellyn took to be the essence of his view the words he quoted from nineteenth 
century German commercial lawyer, Levin Goldschmidt:  
Every fact-pattern of common life, so far as the legal order can take it in, carries with-
in itself its appropriate, natural rules, its right law. This is a natural law which is real, 
not imaginary; it is not a creature of mere reason, but rests on the solid foundation of 
what reason can recognize in the nature of man and of the life conditions of the time 
and place; it is thus not eternal nor changeless nor everywhere the same, but is in-
                                                    
33 Llewellyn (n 9) 3–4. 
34 Ibid, 4 (emphasis in original). 
35 Ibid 5. 
36 Llewellyn (n 14) 72; see also Llewellyn (n 9) 6. 





dwelling in the very circumstances of life. The highest task of law-giving consists in 
uncovering and implementing this immanent law.38 
As Llewellyn intensified his focus on prevailing norms among the people as the 
source for law’s development, he was moved to suggest that even those who spoke of 
natural law in the sense of timeless, universal principles, were more often talking 
about what they were familiar with: ‘[W]hen the natural law philosopher proposes his 
ideal solutions’, Llewellyn wrote, ‘he again and again reverts to positive law of his 
homeland’.39 On another occasion he warned of the error he attributed to ‘fourth-rate 
Natural Lawyers’, the error of treating the conventions of their day as reflecting some 
self-evident reality.40  
The standards by which laws are to be assessed, then, were not timeless: ‘in regard 
to matters of change or crisis I am prepared to argue firmly that right timing…also 
becomes a vital aspect of the rightness…of the relevant portions of right-law [i.e., 
what law ought to be]’.41 This is because what the law ought to be, the idea that the 
law ought to pursue must be ‘so built as to have heavy impact upon its own people, 
and so upon the people of some one particular time, place and cultural tradition’.42  
Those who still find odd Llewellyn’s suggestion that natural law was implicit in a 
society’s norms and values might try to dismiss it as the product of an idiosyncratic 
definition of the latter term, which means almost the opposite of the prevailing un-
derstanding of the term. But this understanding was not an invention of Llewellyn’s 
wild imagination. If one tries to find the intellectual sources on which Llewellyn drew 
for his views, there seem to be two main sources. One, already alluded to, is German 
romanticism and its legal counterpart, the historical school of jurisprudence and its 
interpretation of natural law.43 The other, no less important, is American ideas of self-
government and democracy, and their relationship to natural law. Llewellyn’s em-
brace of natural law can thus be understood as an attempt to bring together these two 
                                                    
38 Ibid, 122. Of these words Llewellyn said: ‘I doubt if the matter has ever been better put than that’. 
Ibid.  
39 Llewellyn (n 26) 77. 
40 Llewellyn (n 14) 4. Curiously, Llewellyn attributed this mistake to both the American Declaration 
of Independence and the Communist Manifesto. Ibid. 
41 Karl N. Llewellyn, ‘What Law Cannot Do for Inter-Racial Peace’ (1957) 3 Villanova Law Review 
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strands of thought. Llewellyn did this through his interpretation of the ‘common law 
tradition’, especially in its American incarnation.  
Llewellyn did this by connecting three ideas—historical jurisprudence, the com-
mon law, and democracy—to ‘the people’. Llewellyn was not the first to draw a link 
between the first two,44 but more than those before him he drew an explicit connec-
tion between American common law and American democracy. In one of his discus-
sions of his distinction between the ‘formal’ and ‘grand’ styles of adjudication he drew 
a contrast between a view that seeks to ‘discipline society’ and the view that seeks to 
‘follow society’. In this and other respects the formal style ‘r[a]n counter’ to various 
ideas ‘gathered under the label of “democracy”’,45 at least if democracy as understood, 
as it did for him, as an ‘active participation of the beneficiaries’.46 In a similar way he 
highlighted American common law’s ‘earthly rooting’, its distributed nature among 
the different states, the fact that it was a law that ‘voices…the residual non-expert 
horse-sense of the community’.47  
The idea of self-government or popular sovereignty has been central to the 
American conception of democracy, and the debates on the structure of the American 
polity that accompanied the founding of the United States and the adoption of the 
federal Constitution can, in part, be understood as debates on the problem of recon-
ciling ideas of natural law with ideas of self-government.48 Whether and how this is to 
be done has been the subject of numerous studies on the political ideas at the time of 
the founding of the American republic. For our purposes, what matters is the way 
Llewellyn blended these ideas to present what he thought was a distinctly American 
conception of the common law as an essential ingredient of American democracy. 
Though not a matter on which Llewellyn wrote at great length, what he did write 
reveals a political theory of law, one that sees this societal natural law as imposing a 
constraint on judges and providing certainty to the law that legal texts on their were 
incapable of providing. It provided a political limit to legitimate (and perhaps also 
feasible) use of the law for the promotion of social change. At the same time, this is a 
vision of law that is fundamentally opposed to government that is ‘secret, self-
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46 Ibid, 29. 
47 Ibid, 30, 31. 
48 There is potential tension between notions of natural law and popular sovereignty. For discussions 
of attempts to reconcile them see Ernest Barker, Traditions of Civility: Eight Essays (Cambridge: Cam-
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sufficient in judgment and standard, accounting neither to the individual for particu-
lar decision nor to the public for general policy’.49 
 All of this calls for some revision of the still-popular image of legal realism, or 
more accurately of Llewellyn’s legal realism, and its place in the map of contemporary 
legal theory. Hart correctly recognized Llewellyn’s views as fundamentally at odds 
with his, but his explanation of the difference was mistaken because he misunderstood 
Llewellyn’s position. In The Concept of Law Hart treated Llewellyn (on the basis of a 
single sentence taken out of context) as a paradigmatic example of rule scepticism.50 
But this is a mistake, since, as we have shown, Llewellyn never doubted that rules 
provided the law with considerable certainty.51 The difference between Llewellyn and 
Hart lies elsewhere. In Hart’s view, the legal rules are capable of constraining because 
their verbal formulations apply clearly to some cases.52 For Hart (and many other le-
gal positivists) these clear and uncontroversial applications of rules mark out the lim-
its of law’s domain.53 Hart did not think judges can never rely on moral considera-
tions, but when they did so they were relying on moral or social considerations that 
stood outside the law.54  
Llewellyn rejected all this. Law was largely certain, but not because deduction 
from legal rules provided certainty, and definitely not because there was a clearly-
defined domain of law identified as the domain of posited legal rules. Law for him was 
largely certain precisely because law was more than legal rules.55 In contrast to the posi-
tivist picture, both the constraints that fix the content of the law, and the ideals that 
law should pursue, are part of the law. Thus, there are no clear boundaries between 
law and society, and between law and non-law.56 It is the process of socialization that 
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provides the limiting constraints fixing the content of law, but also the law’s ideals. 
Indeed, in this picture the distinction between the reality and ideal of the law be-
comes blurred. This, we think, is the deepest sense in which Llewellyn is an anti-
positivist and the sense in which he thought of himself as a natural lawyer.57  
II. JEROME FRANK: PRAGMATIC SCHOLASTICISM 
There is admittedly something ironic about ascribing the label ‘natural law’ to any of 
Jerome Frank’s views. The reason is that Frank himself often shunned the term, con-
cluding it was too malleable and ambiguous to be of much use. Nevertheless, like 
Llewellyn, he endorsed philosophical views associated with both ancient and modern 
versions of natural law theory and expressed increasing sympathy for what he took to 
be its main principles. Frank’s commitment to those principles, including his faith in 
the natural freedom and individual dignity of all humans, may seem at odds with the 
scepticism for which Frank is famous.58 For that reason, and as already noted, some 
have been tempted to write off the former set of views as the result of a postwar trans-
formation of sorts, fuelled by a need to distance himself from legal-realist ideas linked 
by others to the rise of fascism and Nazism. But while it is true that Frank’s discus-
sions of natural law mostly occur in the 1940s, we argue that both his faith and his 
scepticism stem from the same pragmatist philosophical outlook, which one finds in 
even his earliest writings. 
There is no doubt that Frank had trouble with the term ‘natural law’. In some of 
his later writings, he criticized it and called for its abandonment.59 He said he found 
the term ambiguous, confusing, and susceptible to abuse. He wrote, for example, that 
even ‘Nazidom has its ideals, its own vicious notions of “natural law” and justice’.60 
Closer to home, the language of natural law and natural rights had been used ‘to 
sanctify the most deplorable consequences of the commercial revolution’, by which 
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58 Jerome Frank, Fate and Freedom: A Philosophy for Free Americans, rev. ed. (Boston: Beacon, 1953) 
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Frank referred to social Darwinism and economic laissez faire.61 But the concern was 
not just with terminology; Frank also objected to a particular form of argument that 
relied on natural law. Frank vehemently disagreed with the view that it is possible to 
derive any automatic prescription for human society from nature: ‘Nature is no copy-
book containing precepts for civilized man. Nor is human nature, unartificilized, a 
sound foundation for a beneficent social structure’.62 Thus, Frank pleaded, ‘[i]t is high 
time…that we put an end to the process of referring to “nature” as the justification 
for any particular social program….The honest approach is to say: “Here is my pro-
gram. Whether or not it is ‘right’ depends upon whether it is in accord with, and will 
promote, values and ideals which you think both desirable and possible of achieve-
ment….”’.63  
Frank identified another problem with the term. Throughout history it had be-
come mixed up with the causal claim that laws of nature determined all events, includ-
ing human behaviour.64 Thus, many exponents of natural law had been complicit in 
aiding and abetting what was, for Frank, the true philosophical foe, namely scientific 
determinism (or as he sometimes called it ‘fatalism’).65  
Frank’s commitment to human free will is an important theme to which we will 
return, but it is worth first laying out why, despite his reservations about the termi-
nology of natural law, Frank nonetheless embraced its central tenets. In his 1945 
book, Fate and Freedom, Frank emphasized that the following ideas and beliefs were 
‘never more precious than today’: ‘the ideals of justice and equality, a high regard for 
non-material values’, and ‘a belief in the necessity of restraints on absolutism and ar-
bitrariness in government’.66 He then went on to say that ‘[n]o decent, intelligent 
American will disagree’ with the repudiation of the idea that ‘man’s “free will is fro-
zen into muscular behavior,” or with a “belief in the brotherhood of man.”’67 Rather, 
most Americans, Frank explained, would accept the idea that there are such ‘basic 
principles’, which are ‘derived from man’s nature’, and that positive law ought to re-
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flect them.68 In a different essay from the same period he reiterated this view when he 
praised the ‘Scholastic version of natural law [which] symbolizes a noble ideal of min-
imum human decencies’.69 
For Frank, Thomas Aquinas represented the best of the natural law tradition. 
‘Wise and, for his day, tolerant’, Frank explained, ‘St. Thomas taught that there are 
but a few, and highly general, immutable principles of natural law. Men should do 
good and avoid evil, good being what is good for man in the light of his “natural” in-
clinations’.70 There were also a few secondary principles, such as ‘not to kill, not to 
steal, to return goods held in trust’.71 Most importantly, Aquinas understood that how 
these principles applied to actual human problems varied with time and place. Thus, 
the chief virtue of Aquinas’s understanding of natural law was that it was ‘exceedingly 
flexible and relatively undogmatic’.72 Moreover, Frank endorsed the views that such 
values as freedom, justice, and equality really exist, that one could reason about them, 
and that judges should make reference to such values when deciding cases. In that 
sense, then, it seems plausible to characterize Frank as a defender of natural law. 
Or does it? Even if one acknowledges that Frank wrote such statements of sup-
port for these natural-law views, one might still object that they seem entirely ad hoc 
and thus insufficient to alter our overall impression of Frank’s thought. More than 
Llewellyn, these views seem plainly inconsistent with the extreme scepticism about 
law and judicial decision-making that made Frank famous.73 
One explanation for this apparent change in view is a historical one. Frank wrote 
Law and the Modern Mind in 1930, when sceptical views about religion and morality 
were increasingly common among social scientists and intellectuals in the United 
States.74 But by the time Frank was writing Fate and Freedom, the Allies were engaged 
in a world war against fascist and Nazi regimes, and the legal realists with whom 
Frank had been associated, had been attacked for endorsing views that gave philo-
sophical support to such regimes. Thus, some have suggested that Frank’s volte face 
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is best understood as an effort to mollify his critics and to pledge his allegiance to 
truth, justice, and the American way. Indeed, many scholars have interpreted Frank’s 
and other realists’ writing in something like this way.75 
There is a morsel of truth in this explanation. Frank himself acknowledged that 
the experience of confronting the Nazi regime made the recognition of certain basic 
human values particularly pressing.76 But the charge that Frank fundamentally 
changed his views does not hold up under scrutiny, for it ignores both the extent to 
which Frank’s deeper philosophical commitments remained consistent over this time 
period and the extent to which his understanding of natural law flowed from those 
commitments. 
In particular, from his earlier writings to his latest ones, Frank was a philosophical 
pragmatist who assessed metaphysical concepts and theories—whether about the na-
ture of the world, of the person, or of law—by how well their practical consequences 
served human needs and purposes.77 Frank combined this background philosophical 
view with a conviction that the most important human purpose in the political or 
moral sphere was to improve society overall, and that a judge’s most important pur-
pose when deciding cases was to ensure that justice is done in the individual case. 
This combination of philosophical outlook and substantive moral convictions about 
human purposes help explain the apparent contradictions noted above. For Frank, a 
properly sceptical attitude, which sees all knowledge as partial, ought to stimulate, 
rather than dampen, efforts to achieve reform and justice.  
In the moral and political sphere, Frank embraced the quintessentially American 
idea that the future could be better than the past, together with the more controver-
sial idea that law and government are an important means for achieving that goal.78 In 
his view, in order to make good on that possibility, the American people had to rec-
ognize that they had control over their own destiny and the freedom to choose wisely. 
And that meant rejecting the doctrine of scientific determinism. ‘The world’s future’, 
he wrote, ‘depends on human purposes, not on fate’. While some things are inevita-
ble, he explained, others are not, so that ‘[w]e must reject the suggestion that we are 
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but molecules in a wave of the future. We must assert our faith in the power of free 
men to preserve a civilization in which freedom will seem to have been inevitable—
because free men have effectively willed that it should persist’.79 And for Frank, re-
jecting determinism meant welcoming the inherent unpredictability of life. Frank 
thought we ought to embrace ‘the Renaissance belief in the reality of chance, a belief 
which the orthodox religion of science regards with horror’.80 
These quotations all come from Fate and Freedom, but there are important conti-
nuities and similarities between his earlier and later works. Frank’s almost obsessive 
concern with the need to come to grips with deep epistemic uncertainty pervades his 
first book, Law and the Modern Mind.81 Frank was primarily concerned there with at-
tacking the demand for legal certainty, which he thought reflected childlike longings 
for security and comfort. But he found the same immature impulse driving what was, 
in his view, an equally quixotic effort to uncover causal laws governing the universe.82 
‘Science, wisely considered is no substitute for the all-wise, all-powerful father’, Frank 
insisted. ‘The fact of change and chance must be bravely faced’.83 
We can now see more clearly why Frank both embraced many of the substantive 
moral and political values associated with natural law but resisted the label itself. On 
the one hand, he recognized that the core principles of a Thomistic natural law were 
invaluable as ideals and guides for action.84 They were sound if vague first principles 
and for a pragmatist like Frank, that fact was sufficient to justify belief their exist-
ence.85 But he resisted the idea that these principles closed any inquiry and that any 
particular application of those principles was permanently carved into nature itself be-
cause that view needlessly limited man’s capacity to improve social and political life. 
That is why Frank was so concerned with showing how moralistic notions of natural 
law were, as a historical matter, bound up with the view that physical laws causally 
determined everything in nature, including human behaviour. By appealing to ‘laws 
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of nature’ both the normative and the causal versions of natural law had the conse-
quence of limiting the possibilities for, and motivation to achieve, human freedom.86 
In this way, Frank’s scepticism served as a source not of despair but of faith, both 
in man’s dignity and in social progress. If we can only gain knowledge of the world 
through our (limited, partial) human perceptual and cognitive faculties, then we can 
never know with certainty what the natural world is really like or how it operates. 
This means we need not accept the stultifying and depressing assumption that all 
human behaviour has been causally predetermined. Instead, since believing in free 
will, human dignity, and the core, eternal principles of natural law helps us bring 
about a more just and humane world, we are justified in holding such metaphysical 
and moral commitments.87 At the same time, remaining humble about our ability to 
discern what those general principles of natural law require in any particular set of 
circumstances should make us pause before advocating policies on the assumption 
that ‘nature’ requires them. ‘Less cocksure about what we know and can know’, Frank 
explained, ‘we can be more sure that our choices will be real, not illusions’.88 
We can see the same kind of dynamic at work in Frank’s discussion of legal deci-
sion-making, where once again he uses scepticism to motivate and justify the pursuit 
of justice. In his early work the logic of Frank’s argument is as follows: It is impossible 
to be certain about how judges will decide cases, either by looking to the relevant le-
gal rules (as traditional jurists had argued) or by using the methods of social science 
(as other realists had argued).89 The reason is that a judge’s idiosyncratic (and hence 
unpredictable) biases and prejudices often determine how he finds facts—for example, 
which witnesses he will believe and which he will not—thereby making it nearly im-
possible to predict how the legal rules will apply to future cases, even when those 
rules are clear.90 Thus, there is little point in judges trying to decide cases in such a 
way as to develop rules for future cases.91 Instead, Frank argued, such legal uncertain-
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88 Ibid, at 336.  
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ty should encourage judges to focus on the one thing that they can know and can con-
trol, namely how the legal materials ought to apply to the parties to the present case. 
For in Frank’s view, the rules were simply instruments whose purpose was to serve 
justice to the parties in the case, so they should be interpreted accordingly.92 
Frank was thus hardly sceptical about the possibility of securing genuinely just 
outcomes in individual cases. He merely thought that to pursue justice judges had to 
treat legal rules flexibly and attend primarily to the particular facts of the case. ‘The 
judge, at his best, is an arbitrator’, Frank insisted, ‘a “sound man” who strives to do jus-
tice to the parties by exercising a wise discretion with reference to the peculiar cir-
cumstances of the case.’93 His task, according to Frank, was to do ‘equity’ in the Aris-
totelian sense.94 Indeed, Frank’s only criticism of Aristotle was that he treated equity 
as distinct from, and even contrary to, ‘law’, whereas Frank insisted that the two were 
‘so thoroughly intermingled that it is impossible to divide them’.95 
In this way, we can see a position that bears important similarities to his later 
views. He thought that values were more than mere prejudice and that judges should 
rely on them to reach just outcomes based on the particular circumstances of the 
case.96 What distinguished Frank’s approach from more traditional views of natural 
law, however, was that for Frank, the key to securing just outcomes in adjudication 
lay not in properly deducing conclusions from the rules, nor in rigorously searching 
through of the case law. It required instead that judges attempt to overcome their 
own biases and prejudices through a process of introspection and self-analysis in the 
hope that doing so would enable them to discern in a less distorted way the relevant 
moral (and legal) considerations.97  
Though Frank held on to all this throughout his life, one can identify a shift in his 
views from this highly personalist views of his earlier works toward greater respect for 
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the values held by the people. We identified a similar shift toward this view in Llewel-
lyn’s work, although they drew on different intellectual sources in reaching this view. 
Frank contrasted Plato’s conception of natural law with Aristotle’s. Plato’s version of 
natural law was eternal and unchanging; Aristotle, by contrast, ‘saw unconquerable 
unruliness, spontaneous chance and change, as part of reality, [and therefore] his no-
tion of “natural law” was not likely to be that of an “absolute standard,” permanent 
and unchanging’.98 Frank drew an explicit link between Plato’s conception of natural 
law and his totalitarianism and his ‘contempt for democracy’, and between Aristotle’s 
openness to chance and his support for ‘the loose texture of democracy’.99 In Frank’s 
thinking a central reason for democracy is its recognition that certainty is an illusion 
and that those who claim to the right to rule because they have all the answers must 
be resisted. This is how Frank tied an epistemological thesis to political theory.100 
Frank drew a similar connection between metaphysics and legal theory in a judi-
cial opinion touching on the question of judicial impartiality. To be impartial judges 
need not, indeed cannot, become devoid of values, he said. This level of disinterest-
edness is only available to the dead. To the living, appeal to values is necessary and 
desirable. But which values? Frank mentioned, once again, the possibility of ‘universal 
values’ acknowledged by ‘those devoted to “natural law” philosophy’, but stated that 
these values are ‘few and highly general’ and ‘their applications vary with time, place 
and circumstance’.101 In a manner not dissimilar to Llewellyn, he argued that what 
determines their content and application in particular circumstances were the values 
of the community:  
[E]very human society has a multitude of established attitudes, unquestioned postu-
lates. Cosmically, they may seem parochial prejudices, but many of them represent the 
community’s most cherished values and ideals. Such social pre-conceptions, the “value 
judgments” which members of any given society take for granted and use as the un-
spoken axioms of thinking, find their way into that society's legal system, become 
what has been termed “the valuation system of the law.” The judge in our society 
owes a duty to act in accordance with those basic predilections inhering in our legal 
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ral Law, Precedent, and Thurman Arnold’ (1938) 24 Virginia Law Review 587, 611–12. 
99 Frank (n 60) 1127–28. 
100 In seeing this connection, Frank was typical of his time. See Purcell (n 3) 205 (observing that for 
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system (although, of course, he has the right, at times, to urge that some of them be 
modified or abandoned).102 
The values that underlie the law may be indefensible from the perspective of the 
cosmos, but that does not make them less real, and—in a democracy—less binding on 
the judge. Frank recognized that this was no panacea. He openly admitted that even 
in a particular period there is never perfect uniformity of opinion among all people,103 
which meant that uncertainty, in both law and fact-finding could not be eradicated. 
But just like in his earlier, more individualistic, perspective, Frank argued that these 
values should not be hidden or ignored. That was the kind of pragmatic constraint 
that was appropriate for an open, democratic society.  
This view about how judges ought to go about resolving disputes was related for 
Frank to his views about the nature of law, and to the extent that we can find in them 
similarities to contemporary position, here too his views reveal clear continuity and 
seem to fit contemporary natural law theory (or at least versions of anti-positivism) 
much more than legal positivism. In Law and the Modern Mind Frank dismissed the 
positivist thesis about the limits of law: ‘what Pound calls law and what he calls non-
legal cannot be separated. They are so thoroughly intermingled that it is impossible 
to divide them’.104 Some fifteen years later, in discussing ‘the relation of the natural 
law thesis to judicial activities’ Frank states, in a manner that would not be out of 
place in Fuller: ‘“Thus the ideal is constantly becoming the positive” and “in the evo-
lution of the common law system the opposition between positive and natural law is 
constantly overcome”’.105  
IV. CONCLUSION: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RECONSTRUCTING THE PAST 
‘We are all realists now’, as the saying goes, but what does that mean? ‘We’, after all, 
hold very different views on almost every topic that bears on realist themes: law, mo-
rality, society, politics, and the relationships among them. If, despite all our differ-
ences, we are all realists now, this must mean one of two things. Either the realism 
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that we all share is so thin and banal that no-one could possibly object to it, or we 
mean by ‘legal realism’ utterly different things. With regard to some things, it may 
well be that we are all realists because the realists ideas are indeed rather banal and 
incontestable; although if that is the case, the realists would have little claim to being 
the seminal figures they are often held up to be.106 Thus, it seems more likely that 
scholars are drawing different lessons from the realists based on their own interests, 
values, and purposes.  
Nor do we claim to be any different in this regard. No doubt we too are reading 
Llewellyn and Frank (and ‘legal realism’ more generally) through the lens of our in-
terests, values, and purposes. And indeed, that recognition may itself one of the core 
messages both Frank and Llewellyn considered part of their legal realism. Neverthe-
less, while recognizing the historical embeddedness of all efforts to theorize about law 
(or any other social or political phenomenon), two points are worth mentioning. 
First, in our goal of reconstructing the thought of Frank and Llewellyn, we have 
above all sought to interpret what these thinkers said on their own terms, rather than 
simply assume that we can understand them by placing them within a particular his-
torical context or political movement.   
Second, our own interpretation of realism cannot be explained as merely the 
product of our historical moment, because in fact it cuts against the grain of the most 
popular interpretations of realism today. Legal realism is now back in vogue, even 
spawning a modern reincarnation known as ‘new legal realism’, in part because there 
has been renewed interest and confidence in bringing the social sciences to bear on 
legal issues.107 Thus, these days scholars—even those critical of the ‘empirical turn’—
typically treat legal realism as largely an effort to convert law and legal scholarship in 
a more social scientific direction. Morton Horwitz, for example, has criticized ‘[t]he 
social science methodology that Llewellyn sought to represent…as the essence of Re-
alism’.108 But although many of the legal realists certainly did see real possibilities in a 
more social-scientific orientation in legal scholarship, Llewellyn and Frank were in 
fact among the least enthusiastic about such an approach. In their different ways, they 
put much greater focus on law as part of the humanities, as an ‘art’ or a ‘craft’. This 
may be yet another reason why they felt more comfortable with the label of natural 
law than some of their realist contemporaries.  
                                                    
106 This is, in a sentence, Brian Tamanaha’s central claim in Beyond the Formalist–Realist Divide: The 
Role of Politics in Judging (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). We think that claim is likely too 
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